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The sending-or-not-sending (SNS) protocol of the twin-field quantum key distribution (TFQKD)
can tolerant large misalignment error and its key rate can exceed the linear bound of repeaterless
QKD. But the original SNS protocol requires the two users to use the same source parameters. Here
we propose a general protocol with asymmetric source parameters and give the security proof of
this protocol. Our general protocol has a much better performance than that of the original SNS
protocol when the channel is asymmetric.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.81.Gs, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution provides a method for un-
conditionally secure communication [1–9] between two
parties, Alice and Bob. Combined with the decoy-state
method [10–15] and measurement-device-independent
QKD (MDIQKD) protocol [16, 17], QKD can overcome
the security loophole from the nonideal single-photon
sources [18–20] and imperfect detection devices [21, 22]
and has developed rapidly both in theory [23–40] and ex-
periment [41–63]. The maximum distance of decoy-state
MDIQKD has been experimentally increased to 404 kilo-
meters [64]. But the key rate of BB84, MDIQKD pro-
tocol, or any modified version of these protocols cannot
exceed the linear bounds of repeaterless QKD, such as
the TGW bound [65] and the PLOB bound [66].
Recently, a new protocol named twin-field quantum
key distribution (TFQKD) was proposed [67] whose
key rate dependence on the channel transmittance η is
R ∼ O(√η). Following this protocol, many variants of
TFQKD were proposed [68–79] and some experiments of
TFQKD were demonstrated [80–83]. Among those pro-
tocols, one efficient protocol named the sending-or-not-
sending (SNS) protocol [68] has the advantages of un-
conditionally security under coherent attacks and it can
tolerant large misalignment error. And the SNS protocol
with finite data size has been studied [84, 85]. However,
the security proof of the SNS protocol requires the con-
dition that the two users, Alice and Bob, use the same
source parameters, such as the intensities of signal and
decoy sources and the probability for sending coherent
pulses in the Z windows.
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Here we propose a general SNS protocol where Alice
and Bob are not required to use the same source param-
eters. We give a security proof for this general proto-
col. Then we apply our general protocol to the case of
asymmetric channels, i.e., the channel between Alice and
Charlie (we will call it “Alice’s channel” for simplicity in
this paper) and that between Bob and Charlie (we will
call it “Bob’s channel” for simplicity in this paper) are
not the same. The numerical results show that in this
case the key rate of our general protocol is much higher
than that of the original SNS protocol.
This paper is arranged as follows. In Sec. II, we present
the procedures of our general SNS protocol with asym-
metric source parameters. In Sec. III, we give a security
proof of our protocol through three virtual protocols and
their reductions. We show the results of numerical sim-
ulation of the general SNS protocol compared with the
original SNS protocol in Sec. IV. The article ends with
some concluding remarks in Sec. V. We give the formulas
for key rate calculation in the appendix.
II. GENERAL SNS PROTOCOL WITH
ASYMMETRIC SOURCE PARAMETERS
A schematic of our general SNS protocol is shown in
Figure 1. The two legitimate users, Alice and Bob, in-
dependently send coherent pulses and vacuum pulses to
an untrusted third party (UTP), Charlie. Charlie takes
compensation to the pulses, measures them, and an-
nounces the measurement results. Then Alice and Bob
distill the final key from a set of the pulses according
to the announced data. The details of the protocol are
shown as follows.
Step 1. In each time window i, they (Alice and Bob)
independently decide whether this is a decoy window or
2FIG. 1: A schematic of the setup for the general SNS pro-
tocol. IM: intensity modulator; PM: phase modulator; BS:
beam-splitter; DL & DR: single-photon detector in the mea-
surement station of Charlie.
a signal window. In her (his) decoy window, she (he)
randomly chooses one of a few states ρAk (ρBk), for
k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , to send out a decoy pulse to Charlie
where ρA0 = ρB0 = |0〉〈0| are the vacuum states and
ρAk (ρBk), k > 0, are coherent states |√µAkeiδAi+iγAi〉
(|√µBkeiδBi+iγBi〉). (In this paper, we denote the imag-
inary unit as i.) In her (his) signal window, she (he)
decides to send out to Charlie a signal pulse in the state
|√µ′AeiδAi+iγAi〉 (|√µ′BeiδBi+iγBi〉) and puts down a bit
value 1 (0) by probability ǫA (ǫB), or decides not to send
it out and puts down a bit value 0 (1) by probability 1−ǫA
(1− ǫB). Here, δAi, δBi, γAi, and γBi are random phase.
The global phases γAi and γBi can be any reference phase
and known by anyone. The private phase δAi (δBi) is a
random phase taken by Alice (Bob) secretly. Besides, we
request the following mathematical constraint for source
parameters:
µAk
µBk
=
ǫA(1− ǫB)µ′Ae−µ
′
A
ǫB(1 − ǫA)µ′Be−µ
′
B
(1)
for each k > 0.
As the major result of this work, this constraint guar-
antees the security of the general SNS protocol with
asymmetric source parameters for Alice and Bob. The
real protocol here is actually same with that in ref. [68]
except for this mathematical constraint and the virtual
protocols for security proof will use different types of en-
tangled states.
For ease of presentation, we will omit the subscript i
if it doesn’t cause any confusion. But keep in mind that
all δA, δB, γA, and γB are chosen differently in different
time windows.
Step 2. Charlie is supposed to measure all twin fields
with a beam splitter after taking phase compensation and
announce the measurement outcome.
Note: Charlie is expected to remove the phase γA and
γB by phase compensation. His action only affects the
key rate, but has not influence on the security of the
protocol.
Step 3. They announce each one’s decoy windows and
signal windows. And they announce the intensities of the
decoy pulses and the private phases δA and δB in each
decoy window.
Definition: We define a Z-window when both of them
determine signal windows and an X-window when both
of them determine decoy windows. We define an effective
event when one and only one Charlie’s detector clicks,
and the corresponding window is called an effective win-
dow.
Given that δA (δB) is randomized, whenever Alice
(Bob) sends a coherent state with intensity µ′A (µ
′
B),
it can be equivalently regarded as a density matrix∑∞
k=0
e−µ
′
Aµ′kA
k! |k〉〈k| (
∑∞
k=0
e−µ
′
Bµ′kB
k! |k〉〈k|), which is a
classical mixture of different photon number states only.
Hence among all Z-windows, we can define a set of Z1-
windows, in which one and only one of them decides to
send and she (he) actually sends a single-photon state.
They don’t know which time window is a Z1-window,
but they can calculate the number of Z1-windows in an
experiment.
Among all X-windows, we define a set of X˜-windows,
in which they choose the intensities µAk and µBk with
the same k and the phase shifts δA and δB satisfy the
restriction
1− | cos(δA − δB +∆ϕ)| ≤ |λ|. (2)
Here the values ∆ϕ and λ are some values determined by
Alice and Bob according to the result of channel test and
calibration in the experiment to obtain a satisfactory key
rate and the value of ∆ϕ can be different from time to
time. In this paper, we will set ∆ϕ = 0 for presentation
simplicity, i.e.
1− | cos(δA − δB)| ≤ |λ|, (3)
but this doesn’t affect the validity of the security proof if
we use Eq.(2) for the post selection. They keep the data
of the effective events and discard all the others.
Step 4. They randomly choose some events from the
effective Z-windows to do the error test. A bit-flip error
occurs when Alice’s bit value is different from Bob’s in a
Z-window. They discard the test bits, and the remaining
events from effective Z-windows will be distilled for the
final key.
Step 5. Based on the measurement outcome in effec-
tive X-windows, they calculate n1, the number of effec-
tive events in Z1-windows. Based on the measurement
3outcome and the announced values of δA and δB in effec-
tive X˜-windows, they calculate eph1 , the phase-flip error
rate of effective events in Z1-windows.
Note: In effective X˜-windows, an error occurs when
(1)the left detector clicks and cos(δA − δB) < 0
(2)the right detector clicks and cos(δA − δB) > 0.
Given this definition, they can observe the error rates
in X˜-windows for each intensities of input light. With
this, they can estimate eph1 through the decoy state anal-
ysis which requests them to observe the counting rates of
various intensities of input light. As proved in ref. [68],
decoy state method can applied to our protocol as if the
phases δA and δB were not announced. In the asymptotic
case that there are decoy states with infinite different in-
tensities, they can obtain the exact value of eph1 . In the
case that there are decoy states with finite different in-
tensities, they can obtain the upper bound of eph1 .
Note: The Appendix shows the four-intensity method
of this protocol. In this case, the formulas for n1 and e
ph
1
are given in Eqs.(37)-(40).
Step 6. They perform the post-processing and obtain
the final key with length
Nf = n1[1−H(eph1 )]− fntH(EZ) (4)
where f is the correction efficiency, nt is the number of
effective Z-windows, and EZ is the bit-flip error rate in
effective Z-windows. Details for calculating the length of
the final key (or the key rate) with four-intensity decoy-
state method are presented in the Appendix.
Note: If we set ǫA = ǫB and µ
′
A = µ
′
B, this protocol is
actually the same as the original SNS protocol in ref. [68].
III. SECURITY PROOF WITH VIRTUAL
PROTOCOLS AND REDUCTION
A. Introduction of the ancillary photons and the
extended states
Similarly to the security proof in Ref. [68], we use the
idea of entanglement distillation with ancillary photons
to proof the security of our protocol.
Image that in a Z-window, if Alice (Bob) decides to
send a coherent state ρA (ρB) to Charlie, she (he) puts
down a local ancillary qubit in the state |1〉 (|0〉), and
if Alice (Bob) decides not to send, she (he) puts down a
local ancillary qubit in the state |0〉 (|1〉). To Alice (Bob),
the state |1〉 corresponds to the bit value 1 (0), and the
state |0〉 corresponds to the bit value 0 (1). We define
subspace T for the subspace of the sent-out states andAn
for the subspace of the local ancillary states. Therefore,
the extended state in the complex space T ⊗ An in the
Z-window can be written as
Ω = ǫAǫB(ρA⊗˜ρB)⊗ |11〉〈11|
+ ǫA(1− ǫB)(ρA⊗˜|0〉〈0|)⊗ |10〉〈10|
+ (1− ǫA)ǫB(|0〉〈0|⊗˜ρB)⊗ |01〉〈01|
+ (1− ǫA)(1− ǫB)(|0〉〈0|⊗˜|0〉〈0|)⊗ |00〉〈00|.
(5)
Here both symbols ⊗ and ⊗˜ are for a tensor product,
and ⊗˜ is the tensor product inside T , and ⊗ is the tensor
product between T and An. The states on the left side
of ⊗ are in T and we name them real-photon states. The
states on the right side of ⊗ are in An and we name
them ancillary-photon states. Since the private phases
δA and δB in Z-windows are kept secret all the time, the
coherent states ρA and ρB are actually phase-randomized
coherent states, whose density matrices are
ρk =
∞∑
n=0
e−µ
′
kµ′nk
n!
|n〉〈n| = µ′ke−µ
′
k |1〉〈1|+(1−µ′ke−µ
′
k)ρ¯k,
(6)
with k = A,B and
ρ¯k =
1
1− µ′ke−µ
′
k
∑
n6=1
e−µ
′
kµ′nk
n!
|n〉〈n|. (7)
So the extended state in the Z-window can be written in
another form:
Ω =
4∑
r=1
qrΩr (8)
and
Ω1 =C1[ǫA(1 − ǫB)µ′Ae−µ
′
A |10〉〈10| ⊗ |10〉〈10|
+ ǫB(1 − ǫA)µ′Be−µ
′
B |01〉〈01| ⊗ |01〉〈01|]
Ω2 =C2[ǫA(1 − ǫB)(1− µ′Ae−µ
′
A)(ρ¯A⊗˜|0〉〈0|)⊗ |10〉〈10|
+ ǫB(1 − ǫA)(1 − µ′Be−µ
′
B )(|0〉〈0|⊗˜ρ¯B)⊗ |01〉〈01|]
Ω3 =|00〉〈00| ⊗ |00〉〈00|
Ω4 =(ρA⊗˜ρB)⊗ |11〉〈11|
(9)
where C1 and C2 are some normalization factors. With
the condition in Eq. (1), Ω1, the target state we used to
prove the security, can be written as
Ω1 =C
2(µA1|10〉〈10| ⊗ |10〉〈10|+ µB1|01〉〈01| ⊗ |01〉〈01|)
(10)
with
C = 1/
√
µA1 + µB1. (11)
In X-windows, the two-mode states sent by them are
ρXk = |βk〉〈βk| (12)
4where
|βk〉 = |√µAkeiδA+iγA〉|√µBkeiδB+iγB 〉. (13)
In our protocol, the states in the Z-windows are ac-
tually classical mixtures of Ω1, Ω2, Ω3, and Ω4. In the
security proof, we first show the security of the protocol
with only the state Ω1 and then show the security of the
protocol with Ω by the tagged model [10, 11].
B. Virtual Protocol 1
Definition: We have define an effective event in the
protocol. An effective ancillary photon is an ancillary
photon corresponding to an effective event.
1. Preparation stage
For each time window i, they preshare the classical
information about whether this time window is an X-
window or Z-window. They preshare an extended state
Ω0 = |Ψ〉〈Ψ| (14)
where
|Ψ〉 = C(√µA1eiγA |10〉 ⊗ |10〉+√µB1eiγB |01〉 ⊗ |01〉)
(15)
and γA and γB are announced publicly. (Remind that
Ω0 and |Ψ〉 vary in different time windows.)
In the time window i which is a Z-window, through
discussion by a secret channel, Alice chooses a random
phase δA and Bob chooses a random phase δB, which
satisfy the restriction Eq.(3). Then they take phase shifts
δA and δB to their own real photons, respectively. In the
time window i which is a X-window, they take random
and independent phase shifts δA and δB to their own
real photons, respectively. After the phase shifts, the
extended state changes into
ΩZ = |Ψ′〉〈Ψ′|, ΩX = |Ψ′〉〈Ψ′| (16)
and
|Ψ′〉 = C(√µA1eiγA+iδA |10〉 ⊗ |10〉
+
√
µB1e
iγB+iδB |01〉 ⊗ |01〉) (17)
Among all X-windows, we define a set of X˜-windows,
in which the phase shifts δA and δB satisfy the restriction
Eq.(3). The states in Z-windows are not identical to
those in X-windows, but they are identical to those in
X˜-windows.
Besides, we define real-photon states |χ0〉 and |χ1〉 for
any time window:
|χ0〉 =C(√µA1eiγA+iδA |10〉+√µB1eiγB+iδB |01〉)
|χ1〉 =C(√µA1eiγA+iδA |10〉 − √µB1eiγB+iδB |01〉)
if cos(δA − δB) ≥ 0
(18)
or
|χ0〉 =C(√µA1eiγA+iδA |10〉 − √µB1eiγB+iδB |01〉)
|χ1〉 =C(√µA1eiγA+iδA |10〉+√µB1eiγB+iδB |01〉)
if cos(δA − δB) < 0
(19)
2. Protocol
V1-1: At any Z-window (X-window), they send the
real photons of ΩZ (ΩX) defined in Eq. (16) to Charlie
and keep the ancillary photons locally.
V1-2: Charlie measures the real photons from Alice
and Bob with a beam splitter after taking phase com-
pensation according to the strong reference lights with
phases γA and γB. He announces his measurement out-
come and then they announce the values of δA and δB
of all X-windows. With the preshared information of X-
and Z-windows, the measurement outcome, and the an-
nounced values of δA and δB, they can obtain effective
Z-windows and effective X˜-windows. The data of other
time windows will be discarded.
Definition: After Step V1-2, the remaining effective
events can be divided into eight subsets according to the
window information (Z-window or X-window), the click-
ing detector (the left L or the right R) and the sign of
cos(δA − δB) (positive + or negative −). These sub-
sets is labeled as Γ(a,d) where Γ = X˜, Z, a = +,−, and
d = L,R. For example, the subset Z(−,R) is the set of
effective Z-windows when the right detector clicks and
cos(δA − δB) < 0. Correspondingly, the effective ancil-
lary photons can be divide into eight subsets labeled as
AΓ(a,d) .
V1-3: They check the phase-flip error rate E(a,d) of
the set AX˜(a,d) , where a = +,− and d = L,R. Since
the effective Z-windows are identical to the effective X˜-
windows, the phase-flip error rate of AX˜(a,d) should be
the same as that of AZ(a,d) (asymptotically).
Note: The state |Ψ′〉 in Eq.(17) can be written in an-
other form:
|Ψ′〉 = 1√
2
(|χ0〉 ⊗ |Φ0〉+ |χ1〉 ⊗ |Φ1〉), if a = + (20)
or
|Ψ′〉 = 1√
2
(|χ1〉 ⊗ |Φ0〉+ |χ0〉 ⊗ |Φ1〉), if a = − (21)
where |Φk〉, k = 0, 1 are two-mode states of ancillary pho-
tons:
|Φ0〉 = 1√
2
(|10〉+ |01〉), |Φ1〉 = 1√
2
(|10〉 − |01〉) (22)
To obtain the phase-flip error rate E(a,d) of the set
AX˜(a,d) , each ancillary photon of this set is measured in
the basis {|Φ0〉, |Φ1〉} and there are n(0)(a,d) outcomes of
5|Φ0〉〈Φ0| and n(1)(a,d) outcomes of |Φ1〉〈Φ1|. The phase-flip
error rate E(a,d) of AX˜(a,d) is define as:
E(a,d) =
min
(
n
(0)
(a,d), n
(1)
(a,d)
)
n(a,d)
(23)
where n(a,d) = n
(0)
(a,d) + n
(1)
(a,d) is the number of the ancil-
lary photons in AX˜(a,d) .
V1-4: With the estimated value of E(a,d), they can
purify the ancillary photons in AZ(a,d) with (a, d) =
(+, R), (+, L), (−, R), (−, L) separately. After purifica-
tion, they obtain ancillary photons in (almost 100%) pure
single-photon entangled states |Φ0〉 (or |Φ1〉). Then they
perform local measurement on their own ancillary pho-
tons and obtain the final key. Alice (Bob) puts down
a bit value 0 (1) or 1 (0) when her (his) measurement
outcome is |0〉〈0| or |1〉〈1| .
Note 1-Security: The security of the final key is based
on the faithfulness of the purification. If they estimate the
error rate E(a,d) of a set of ancillary photons exactly, they
can purify these ancillary photons to get pure entangled
photons. Although Charlie measured the real photons
and they selected the set of ancillary photons based on his
announced measurement outcomes, they check the phase-
flip error rate of these photons by themselves. Since the
extended states of effective X˜-windows are identical to
those of effective Z-windows, the phase-flip error rate of
AX˜(a,d) is exactly the same as that of AZ(a,d) statistically.
They can obtain the phase-flip error rate in AZ(a,d) by
testing the ancillary photon in AX˜(a,d) and then perform
the purification to AZ(a,d) . As a result, the security
of the key doesn’t rely on Charlie’s honesty.
Note 2-Estimation of the phase-flip error rate: Accord-
ing to the definition of E(a,d) in Eq.(23), they have to
measure the ancillary photons in the basis {|Φ0〉, |Φ1〉}.
It’s easy to prove that they can perform local measure-
ment in the basis {|±x〉 = (|0〉± |1〉)/√2} and check the
parity of the outcome instead of measuring in the basis
{|Φ0〉, |Φ1〉}. Explicitly, their outcome with even parity
(|x+〉|x+〉 or |x−〉|x−〉) corresponds to the outcome |Φ0〉
and that with odd parity (|x+〉|x−〉 or |x−〉|x+〉) corre-
sponds to the outcome |Φ1〉.
Note 3-Reduction of the preshare states in X-windows:
Since measurement in the basis {| ± x〉} is a local oper-
ation on the ancillary photons, it makes no difference
whether they measure their ancillary photons after send-
ing the real photons or before that. So they can measure
the ancillary photons before the protocol starts, and la-
bel this time window an X0-window if the outcome is
even parity, or label it an X1-window if the outcome is
odd parity. Then they prepare and send the real photon
in the state
|χ+〉 = C(√µA1eiγA+iδA |10〉+√µB1eiγB+iδB |01〉) (24)
in an X0-window, or prepare and send that in the state
|χ−〉 = C(√µA1eiγA+iδA |10〉 − √µB1eiγB+iδB |01〉) (25)
in an X1-window.
Alternatively, they can start with the information of
X0-windows and X1-windows and the states in Eqs.
(24)(25). They prepare and send real photons in the state
|χ+〉 in X0-windows or in the state |χ−〉 in X1-windows.
In this way, the ancillary photons in X-windows in the
above virtual protocol are not necessary, and the for-
mula of phase-flip error rate should be changed corre-
spondingly. We introduce a symbol X˜(a,b,d) for the set
of effective time windows, which satisfy the restriction in
Eq.(3), with joint events a, b, d where
Event a (a = +,−): the sign of cos(δA − δB).
Event b (b = 0, 1): this times window is an Xb-window.
Event d (d = L,R): the d-detector clicks and the other
doesn’t click.
And we also introduce nX˜(a,b,d) for the number of time
windows in the set X˜(a,b,d). Therefore, we have
n
(b)
(a,d) = NX˜(a,b,d) (26)
and
E(a,d) =
min(NX˜(a,0,d) , NX˜(a,1,d))
n(a,d)
(27)
This reduction of X-windows leads to the Virtual Proto-
col 2.
C. Virtual Protocol 2
1. Preparation stage
For each time window i, they preshare the classical
information about whether this time window is an X0-
window, an X1-window or a Z-window.
They preshare an extended state ΩZ in Eq.(16) for Z-
windows, an real-photon state |χ+〉 for X0-windows and
an real state |χ−〉 for X1-windows.
2. Protocol
V2-1: At any Z-window, they send out the real pho-
tons of ΩZ to Charlie and keep the ancillary photons
locally. At any X0-window (X1-window), they send |χ+〉
(|χ−〉) to Charlie.
V2-2: Charlie measures the real photons from Alice
and Bob with a beam splitter after taking phase com-
pensation according to the strong reference lights with
phases γA and γB. He announces his measurement out-
come and then they announce the values of δA and δB of
all X-windows.
V2-3: They check the phase-flip error rate E(a,d) by
the set X˜(a,0,d) and X˜(a,1,d), where a = +,− and d =
L,R.
V2-4: They purify the ancillary photons in AZ(a,d)
with (a, d) = (+, R), (+, L), (−, R), (−, L) separately
6with the estimated value of E(a,d). Then they perform
local measurement on their own ancillary photons and
obtain the final key.
Note: Reduction of preshared states in X-windows.
Reduction 1: The real-photon states with a = + (a = −)
in X0-windows are actually identical to those with a = −
(a = +) in X1-windows, e.g.
ρ(+,0) = ρ(−,1), ρ(−,0) = ρ(+,1). (28)
So we can conclude that NX˜(a,0,d) = NX˜(a¯,1,d) , where a¯
stands for the opposite sign of a. This means that all
the values NX˜(a,1,d) in the phase-flip error rate in Eq.(27)
can be replaced by NX˜(a¯,0,d) so that X1-windows are not
necessary. They can just use the data from X0-windows
to estimate the phase-flip error rate, and no one else will
find any difference. Therefore, they use only X0-windows
and send only the state |χ+〉 in X-windows. The number
of effective events from the state |χ+〉 and the joint events
a, d (with a = +,−; d = L,R) is denoted as nX˜(a,d) . The
formula of the phase-flip error rate should be changed
into:
E(a,d) =
min(nX˜(a,d) , nX˜(a¯,d))
n(a,d)
(29)
where the formula for n(a,d) should be changed into
n(a,d) = nX˜(a,d) + nX˜(a¯,d) .
Reduction 2: All the effective ancillary photons in Z-
windows can be purified in one batch. The phase-flip
error rate is
Eph =
∑
a,dmin(nX˜(a,d) , nX˜(a¯,d))∑
a,d n(a,d)
=
2
∑
dmin(nX˜(+,d) , nX˜(−,d))
2n1
(30)
where n1 = nX˜(+,L) + nX˜(+,R) + nX˜(−,L) + nX˜(−,R) is the
total number of effective events in X˜-windows. Using
the relations that nX˜(−,L) ≥ min(nX˜(+,L) , nX˜(−,L)) and
nX˜(+,R) ≥ min(nX˜(+,R) , nX˜(−,R)), the phase-flip error rate
can be bounded by
Eph ≤
nX˜(−,L) + nX˜(+,R)
n1
. (31)
In this formula for the phase-flip error rate, we only
need the total number of effective events in X˜-windows
and the number of these two kinds of effective events:
1. the left detector clicks and cos(δA − δB) < 0;
2. the right detector clicks and cos(δA − δB) ≥ 0.
Therefore, we can define these two kinds of effective
events as error events and the corresponding time
windows are defined as error windows. If they set
the value of λ small enough and Charlie perform the
compensation honestly, they may get few error events so
that the phase-flip error rate will be quite low and the
key rate will be high.
Reduction 3: The density matrix in Eq.(12) with
randomized δA and δB can be written as the classical
mixture of a set of states {|ψ(k)l 〉}:
ρXk =
∑
l
p
(k)
l |ψ(k)l 〉〈ψ(k)l | (32)
with
|ψ(k)l 〉 = D(k)l
l∑
n=0
(
√
µAke
iδA+iγA)n√
n!
(
√
µBke
iδB+iγB )l−n√
(l − n)!
|n, l− n〉
(33)
where D
(k)
l are some normalization factors and |ψ(k)1 〉 is
exactly |χ+〉 when the condition in Eq.(1) is satisfied. So
they don’t need to preshare the state |χ+〉. They can send
the phase-randomized coherent state |√µAkeiδA+iγA〉 and
|√µBkeiδB+iγB 〉 to Charlie in X-windows, and then use
the decoy-state method to estimate the bound of the
phase-flip error rate of |χ+〉, eph1 .
Note: If some decoy states with intensities µAm and µBm
are not used to estimate eph1 , these intensities don’t have
to satisfy the constrain in Eq.(1).
D. Virtual Protocol 3
1. Preparation stage
For each time window i, they preshare the classical
information about whether this time window is an X
window or a Z-window.
They preshare an extended state ΩZ in Eq.(16) for Z-
windows.
2. Protocol
V3-1: At any Z-window, they send out the real pho-
tons of ΩZ to Charlie and keep the ancillary photons
locally. At any X-window, Alice (Bob) sends a coherent
state |√µAkeiδA+iγA〉 (|√µBkeiδB+iγB 〉) with random δA
and γA (δB and γB) to Charlie.
V3-2: Charlie measures the real photons from Alice
and Bob with a beam splitter after taking phase com-
pensation according to the strong reference lights with
phases γA and γB. He announces his measurement out-
come and then they announce the values of δA and δB of
all X-windows.
V3-3: They apply decoy-state method with the data of
the effective X˜-windows to estimate the phase-flip error
rate eph1 .
V3-4: They purify the ancillary photons in the effec-
tive Z-windows with the estimated value of eph1 . Then
7they perform local measurement on their own ancillary
photons and obtain the final key.
Note 1: Reduction of preshared states in Z-windows.
Reduction 1: The state ΩZ with the restriction Eq.(3)
is identical to ΩZ without the restriction Eq.(3). If we
regard all Z-windows as a whole, the condition in Eq.(3)
can be loosen, which means that the phase shifts δA
and δB to the real photons can be randomized in the
range [0, 2π) independently. In this way, they don’t need
any mutual information about the phase shifts δA and δB.
Reduction 2: The process that they purify the ef-
fective ancillary photons in Z-windows and then perform
local measurement on them is equivalent to the process
that they measure these ancillary photons in the photon-
number basis and then do classical distillation to the
classical data, which is called quasipurification [3]. In
the latter process, the state in Z-window is
Ω′Z = C
2(µA1|10〉〈10|⊗|10〉〈10|+µB1|01〉〈01|⊗|01〉〈01|),
(34)
which is equivalent to the state Ω1 in Eq.(10). This
means that the protocol can just start with the state Ω
and apply the tagged model to distill the final key from
the effective events using the state Ω1. The length of the
final key should be
nf = n1[1−H(eph1 )]− ntH(EZ) (35)
where n1 is the number of effective events with state Ω1
estimated by decoy-state method, nt is the number of
effective events in Z-windows, and EZ is the bit-flip error
rate of nt. A bit-flip error occurs when Alice’s bit value
is different from Bob’s in a Z-window.
Note 2:Reduction of preshared information of time
windows.
Alice (Bob) determines a signal window by probability pZA
(pZB) and determines a decoy window with intensity µAk
(µBk) by probability p
X
Ak (p
X
Bk), where p
Z
A +
∑
k p
X
Ak = 1
(pZB +
∑
k p
X
Bk = 1). A Z-window is defined when both
of them determine signal windows and an X-window is
defined when both of them determine decoy windows.
Other time windows are regarded as mismatch windows
and they will be discarded. In this way, they don’t need
to preshare any information of time windows, and the
states in Z-windows and X-windows are Ω and ρXk, re-
spectively.
With the reductions above, the virtual protocol is
equivalent to our asymmetric SNS protocol.
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATION WITH
ASYMMETRIC CHANNELS
Here we present the results of numerical simulation of
different SNS protocols in the case that the channels are
asymmetric, i.e., Alice’ channel and Bob’s channel are
different, e.g., they have different channel losses.
Nt ed d ηd fe ξ α
1013 5% 10−10 50% 1.1 10−10 0.2dB/km
TABLE I: Devices’ parameters used in numerical simulations.
Nt is the total number of pulse pairs; ed is the misalignment
error in the X windows; d is the dark count rate of each
detector at the UTP; ηd is the detection efficiency of each
detector at the UTP; fe is the error correction inefficiency. ξ
is the failure probability in the parameter estimation; α is the
channel loss.
The original SNS with the asymmetric channels can be
modified a little to fit the asymmetric channels, which
we call “the modified SNS protocol” in the following.
Consider the case that the original SNS protocol is ap-
plied to the asymmetric channels, when they use the
same source, the intensities of the pulses interfering at
the beam-splitter will differ a lot due to different channel
transmittances, which will cause a high error rate in X-
windows and therefore enhance the phase-flip error rate
of single-photon, eph1 . In the modified SNS protocol, they
still use the same source parameters, but Charlie add an
extra loss to one of the channels to make the transmit-
tances of two channels the same. Explicitly, if the trans-
mittance of Alice’s channel, ηA, is larger than that of
Bob’s channel, ηB, Charlie adds an extra loss 1− ηB/ηA
to Alice’s channel. On the contrary, if ηA < ηB, Char-
lie adds an extra loss 1− ηA/ηB to Bob’s channel. Since
Charlie’s action doesn’t affect the security, the security of
the modified SNS protocol is guaranteed automatically.
We show the numerical results of the optimal key rate
of the original, the modified, and the general SNS pro-
tocols with the asymmetric channels. The effect of the
finite data size has been considered in our calculation.
The device parameters used in the simulation are listed
in Table I. In Figure 2 and Figure 3, we show the op-
timal key rates of three protocols with the difference in
length between the two channels (LB − LA) fixed at 50
km and 100 km, respectively. In the figures, we have
also compared our results with the linear bound of the
repeaterless QKD. There are excellent theoretical linear
bounds for key rate of a repeaterless QKD, such as the fa-
mous TGW bound [65] and the PLOB bound [66]. Also,
we show some details of the optimal key rates with dif-
ferent SNS protocols in Table II. It’s easy to find that
in the asymmetric channels, the performance of our gen-
eral SNS protocol is much better than that of the other
two protocols, especially when the difference in length
between Alice’s and Bob’s channels is large.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a general SNS protocol with
asymmetric source parameters and give a security proof
of this protocol. The intensities and the probabilities for
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FIG. 2: (Color online)The optimized key rates (per pulse pair)
versus transmission distance between Alice and Charlie with
three different SNS protocols. Here the difference in length
between Alice’s and Bob’s channels is fixed at 50 km.
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FIG. 3: (Color online)The optimized key rates (per pulse pair)
versus transmission distance between Alice and Charlie with
three different SNS protocols. Here the difference in length
between Alice’s and Bob’s channels is fixed at 100 km.
sending at Alice’s and Bob’s sides should satisfy the con-
dition given in Eq.(1) to guarantee the security in the
asymmetric case. We present the numerical results of
different SNS protocols to show that our general SNS
protocol gives much high key rate than the other SNS
protocols when Alice’s and Bob’s channels are different.
When the difference in length between Alice’s and Bob’s
channels is 100 km, the key rate of the general SNS pro-
tocol is tens to hundreds of times higher than that of the
original SNS protocol. Our general SNS protocol can be
applied directly to the SNS experiments with asymmetric
channels.
If we use the method of two-way classical communi-
LA(km) LB(km) general SNS modified SNS original SNS
0 50 7.21× 10−4 2.89× 10−4 1.17 × 10−4
150 200 4.73× 10−7 1.95× 10−7 5.52 × 10−8
250 300 1.19× 10−9 5.08× 10−11 0
0 100 8.89× 10−5 2.63× 10−5 8.09 × 10−7
100 200 6.71× 10−7 1.95× 10−7 1.73 × 10−9
200 300 2.09× 10−9 5.08× 10−11 0
TABLE II: The optimal key rates with different SNS proto-
cols. The device parameters used in the simulation are listed
in Table I.
cation [76] on our protocol, the key rate of our general
protocol can be improved further. We shall report this
elsewhere.
Appendix: Formulas For Key Rate Calculation
A. Four-Intensity Decoy-State Method and
Parameter Estimation
In order to make our protocol easy to demonstrate
in the experiment, we give the four-intensity decoy-state
method for our protocol. “Four-intensity” means that Al-
ice (Bob) uses four different intensities, µ′A (µ
′
B) in signal
windows and 0, µA1 (µB1), µA2 (µB2) in decoy windows.
All measurement results in effective X-windows are used
to estimate the bound of n1. Only measurement results
in effective X˜-windows when Alice uses the intensity µA1
and Bob uses the intensity µB1 are used to estimate the
bound of eph1 .
The formula for the length of the final key in Eq.(4)
can be written in the form of key rate per time window:
R = pZAp
Z
B{[ǫA(1 − ǫB)µ′Ae−µ
′
A + ǫB(1 − ǫA)µ′Be−µ
′
B ]
sZ1 [1−H(eph1 )]− fSZH(EZ)}
(36)
where sZ1 is the counting rate in Z1-windows, and SZ is
the counting rate of Z-windows. If there are m effective
windows in a set ζ of n time windows, the counting rate
of ζ is defined as Sζ = m/n.
So we need to estimate the bound of 〈sZ1 〉 and 〈eph1 〉 by
the four-intensity decoy-state method. Here 〈·〉 stands
for the expected value of a variable. Similarly to the
methods in Ref.[84], the lower bound of 〈sZ1 〉 is given by:
〈sZ1 〉 ≥ 〈sZ1 〉 =
µA1
µA1 + µB1
〈sZ10〉+
µB1
µA1 + µB1
〈sZ01〉 (37)
where 〈sZ10〉 is lower bound of the expected value of the
9counting rate of the state |10〉〈10| with
〈sZ10〉=
µ2A2e
µA1〈SµA10〉−µ2A1eµA2〈SµA20〉−(µ2A2−µ2A1)〈S00〉
µA1µA2(µA2 − µA1)
(38)
and 〈sZ01〉 is lower bound of the expected value of the
counting rate of the state |01〉〈01| with
〈sZ01〉=
µ2B2e
µB1〈S0µB1〉−µ2B1eµB2〈S0µB2〉−(µ2B2−µ2B1)〈S00〉
µB1µB2(µB2 − µB1) .
(39)
Here 〈Sαβ〉 is the expected value of the counting rate of
the time windows when Alice and Bob send the decoy
pulses with intensities α and β, respectively. If the data
size is infinite, these expected values are exactly the val-
ues observed in the experiments. If the data size is finite,
we should use the Chernoff Bound introduced in the next
section to estimate the bound of the expected values from
the observed values. The upper bound of 〈eph1 〉 is given
by:
〈eph1 〉 ≤ 〈eph1 〉 =
〈T∆〉 − e−(µA1+µB1)〈S00〉/2
e−(µA1+µB1)(µA1 + µB1)〈sZ1 〉
(40)
where 〈T∆〉 is the expected value of the error counting
rate of X˜-windows, when Alice and Bob send the decoy
pulses with intensities µA1 and µB1, respectively. If there
are m error windows in a set ζ of n time windows, the
error counting rate of ζ is defined as Tζ = m/n.
B. Chernoff Bound
In the asymptotic case where the data size is infinite,
the observed values are the same as the expected values.
But in the nonasymptotic case where the data size is
finite, the observed values are different from the expected
values. So we need the Chernoff bound [86] to estimate
the range of expected values from the observed values
and use the worst case to ensure that the final key is
secure.
Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be n random variables whose ob-
served values are either 0 or 1, X be their sum X =∑
iXi, and φ be the expected value of X . We have the
lower and the upper bound of φ:
φL(X) =
X
1 + δ1(X)
(41)
φU (X) =
X
1− δ2(X) (42)
where δ1(X) and δ2(X) are the solutions of the following
equations:
(
eδ1
(1 + δ1)1+δ1
) X
1+δ1
=
ξ
2
(43)
(
e−δ2
(1− δ2)1−δ2
) X
1−δ2
=
ξ
2
(44)
where ξ is the failure probability. With the above equa-
tions, we have
Nαβ〈Sαβ〉 = φL(NαβSαβ), Nαβ〈Sαβ〉 = φU (NαβSαβ).
(45)
Here Sαβ is the observed value of the counting rate.
Then in Eq.(36) we need the real values of sZ1 and e
ph
1 in
a specific experiment. So Eqs.(41)-(45) can be written in
another form to estimate the upper and the lower bound
of real values from expected values:
XU (φ) = [1 + δ′1(φ)]φ (46)
XL(φ) = [1− δ′2(φ)]φ (47)
where δ′1(φ) and δ
′
2(φ) are the solutions of the following
equations:
(
eδ
′
1
(1 + δ′1)
1+δ′1
)φ
=
ξ
2
(48)
(
e−δ
′
2
(1− δ′2)1−δ′2
)φ
=
ξ
2
(49)
With the above equations, we have
NZ1 s
Z
1 ≥ XL(NZ1 〈sZ1 〉),
NZ1 〈sZ1 〉eph1 ≤ XU (NZ1 〈sZ1 〉〈eph1 〉).
(50)
where NZ1 = Ntp
Z
Ap
Z
B[ǫA(1 − ǫB)µ′Ae−µ
′
A + ǫB(1 −
ǫA)µ
′
Be
−µ′B ] is the number of single-photon state in the
Z windows when one and only one of them decides to
send and Nt is the total number of time windows.
C. Finite Key Size Effect
Similarly to the analysis of the effect of the finite key
size in ref. [85], we give the key rate formula with the
effect of the finite key size of our general SNS protocol in
the universally composable framework [87].
If the length of the final key satisfies
Nf = n1[1−H(eph1 )]− fntH(EZ)
− log2
2
εcor
− 2 log2
1√
2εPAεˆ
,
(51)
the protocol is εsec-secret with εsec = 2εˆ+4ε¯+εPA+εn1 ,
and the total security coefficient of the protocol is εtot =
εcor + εsec. Here εcor is the probability that the error
correction fails, ε¯ is the probability that the real value of
eph1 isn’t in the range that we estimate, εPA is the failure
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probability of the privacy amplification, and εn1 is the
probability that the real value of n1 isn’t in the range
that we estimate. According to Eqs.(37)-(50), we have
ε¯ = 3ξ and εn1 = 6ξ. If we set εcor = εˆ = εPA = ξ in our
numerical simulation, the total security coefficient of our
protocol is εtot = 22ξ = 2.2× 10−9.
Also, Eq.(51) can be written in the form of key rate
per time window with some source parameters:
R = pZAp
Z
B{[ǫA(1− ǫB)µ′Ae−µ
′
A + ǫB(1− ǫA)µ′Be−µ
′
B ]
· sZ1 [1−H(eph1 )]− fSZH(EZ)}
− 1
Nt
(log2
2
εcor
+ 2 log2
1√
2εPAεˆ
).
(52)
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